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Abstract 
The objecth·e of this study is to examine the effects of corporate governance variables on audit fee in 
Nigeria. Specifically, the study examines if board size. board independence, board diligence, board 
expertise, and audit committee independence exert a sign!ficant effect on audit fees in Nigeria. The 
population of the study covers all quoted companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) from 2007-
2011. The study used seconda1J' data obtained from the published annual accounts and reports of one 
hundred and.fifty three (1 53) companies from d!fferent sectors qf companies quoted on the Nigerian stock 
exchange.fi-om 2007-2011. The cluster and simple random sampling technique was used in the selection 
of companies .fi'om the population. The multiple regression analysis was conducted using Pooled 
Ordinary Least Square (POLS) and the panel Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS). The results 
showed that board diligence, board expertise, board size, board independence and audit committee 
independence all have a positive and significant impact on audit fee. It is recommended that auditors 
should have a better understanding of these factors and their relative importance and how the factors 
might be built into an auditfee model. 
Keywords: Corporate Govemance, Audit Fee, Panel Data Regression. 
Introduction 
Gerrerally, there are two perspectives to the relationship between corporate govemance and audit fees; the demand 
side and the supply side. From the demand side, corporate govemance mechanisms may have a positive impact on 
audit fees by ensuring that audit hours are not reduced to a level that compromises the quality of the audit. Hence 
finns with effective corporate govemance. may tend to demand additional assurance from their auditor to preserve· 
their reputation and avoid potential litigation (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002) resulting in a higher audit 
fee. From the supply side, the corporate govemance involvement in strengthening intemal controls may lead the 
extemal auditor to reduce the assessed level of control risk. As a consequence, the auditor's reliance on intemal 
controls should result in less substantive testing and hence a lower audit fee (Collier & Gregory, 1996). 
Griffin, Lont and Sun (2012) typifying this relationship using an economic framework note that auditing is one of 
several mechanisms available to a company to achieve optimal corporate govemance, and that the auditor shares in 
the costs and benefits of changes in govemance resulting in a change in the equilibrium quantity or price of auditing 
relative to the use of other resources for govemance. Hence the company selects an optimal govemance portfolio by 
choosing a pair of intemal control and auditing resources at prices conditional on the expected liability from bad 
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participation during meetings, and post meeting follow-up). The only one of these factors that is publicly observable 
is the number of board meetings. This is frequently used in several studies. Lipton & Lorsch (1992) suggest that a 
major impediment to board effectiveness is a lack of time to complete board duties. In addition, p1ior studies like 
(Conger, Finegold, & Lawler ( 1998); Pound (1995) & Vafeas ( 1999) suggest that an increase in the number of board 
meetings can increase board effectiveness. One view is that a board that demonstrates greater diligence in 
discharging its responsibilities as measured by the number of board meetings will seek an enhanced level of 
oversight of the financial reporting process. As such, we would expect more dilig~t boards to suppprt the purchase 
of a greater amount of extemal auditing services, resulting in higher audit fees. Alternatively, one might argue that a 
greater number of board meetings signal an enhanced degree of oversight by the board, and this enhanced oversight 
may substitute for some of the auditor's effort, thus decreasing the fee. In addition, a more diligent board may 
reduce the auditor's assessment of control risk, also reducing the audit fee. The finding in this respect is also 
inconclusive. This generates the fourth hypothesis in this study that: 
H4: There is no significant relationship between Board diligence and Audit fees 
Audit Committee Independence 
Boo & Shanna (2008) observe a negative association between audit committee independence and audit fees 
indicating that auditors will minimize their effort in the presence of independent audit committee. They observe that 
the existence of audit committee independence can reduce the tendency of control risk in financial reporting. Vafeas 
& Waegelein (2007) examine the association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees shows that 
independent audit committee is positively associated with audit fees and further suggested that audit committee 
serves as a complement to external auditor in monitoring mechanism and financial reporting quality. This generates 
the fifth hypothesis in this study that: 
H5: There is no significant relationship between Audit Committee Independence and 
Audit fees 
Theoretical framework 
The agency theory deals with the contractual relationship between the agent (manager) and the principal 
(shareholders) under which shareholders delegate responsibilities to the manager to run their business. This theory 
argues that when both pa11ies are expected to maximise their utility, there is good reason to believe that the agent 
may engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of the principal's interest. Jensen & Meckling (1976) modeled 
this condition as an agency relationship where the inability of the principal to directly observe the agent's action 
could lead to moral hazard, thus increasing agency cost. In addition, agency theory points out the role of the board of 
directors to monitor both the majority shareholders and management; and to protect minority shareholders' interests 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). How does the detennination of audit pricing fall within the context of the agency theory? 
This question is answered when we consider clearly the cont1ibutions of Jensen & Meckling (1976). According to 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), a component of the agency costs is represented by the monitoring costs supported by 
shareholders for the monitoring of the managers actions. The audit fees are an imp011ant component of these costs, 
as long as auditors have to make sure that managers act according to the shareholders' interests, while also auditors 
have the required task to inspect the accounts of the company. 
Methodology 
Panel data design which may be seen as a combination of both cross-sectional and time-series design properties is 
used for this study. The panel design is a. niethod of studying sample units periodically observed over a defined time 
frame . The population consists of all companies quoted on the Nigeria Stock Exchange as at December 31, 2011. 
There were 250 companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE, Factbook 2011). The sample size for this 
study was based on Yai-nani's (1967) formula in Guilfo"rd & Fruchter (1973). Following the formula, the minimum 
sample size for this study is 132 -quoted companies at 5% levels. We therefore choose to use one hundred and fifty 
three ( 153) companies. 
The cluster sampling technique was adopted in this study. This was complemented with the simple random sampling 
technique. The reason for the choice of the cluster sampling technique is that the population of study (the 250 
companies listed on the NSE) is distributed in different clusters/sectors. Cluster sampling technique will therefore 
make for proportional selection of samples such that the number of subjects selected from each sector will represent 
its share of the entire population. For each company in a given cluster/ sector to have equal chance of being selected, 
the simple random sampling technique was then introduced. The sectors are banking, insurance, agriculture, 
automobile & tyre, breweries, building materials, chemical and paints. Others are conglomerates companies,_ 
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BDIND + 0.260* 0.216* 
(0.000) (0.010) 
BDSIZE + 1.061 * 0.154* 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ACIND + -0.099* 0.022 
(0.010) (0.879) 
AR(1) 
R 0.795 0.174 
ADJR 0.760 0.170 
F-Stat 22.513 44.491 
P(f-stat) 0.000* 0.000* 
D.W 1.5 1.1 
Hausman test 0.037 
Ramsey (Prob) 0.396 
ARCH(Prob) 0.411 
LM Test(Prob) 0.208 
Source: Authors Compilation (2014). *significant at 5% **significant atlO% 















The table shows the result for the Model which examines the effect of corporate govemance on audit fee. 
Specifically, the result clearly provides empirical evidence of the effect of Corporate Govemance Variables {Board 
diligence (BDDILI), Board expertise (BDEXP), Board independence (BDIND) Board size (BDSIZE) and Audit 
committee independence (ACIND)) on Audit fee. The R2 for the three estimations show that the fixed effects is able 
to explain about 79.5% of systemati c variations in AUDFEE with an adjusted value of 0.760 while the Pooled 
estimation explains about 54.0% with an adjusted value of 0.537. The random effect has the lowest R2va lue of 
17.4%. However, the F-stat for all three estimations are all significant as their p-values are all less than 0.05 and this 
indicates that the hypothesis of a significant linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
cannot be rejected at 5% level while the D. W statistics for fixed effects (1.5) and pooled OLS (2.3) indicates the 
presence of setia l con·elation in the residuals is unlikely but this is not the case for the random effects estimation. 
Commenting on the petfom1ance of the Corporate govemance variables, it is interesting to note that the results of 
the three different estimations i.e. the fixed effects model , random effect model and pooled OLS give similar results 
that are all significant at 5% level. BDDILI has a positive impact on AUDFEE with slope coefficients of 0.091, 
0.116 and 0.075 for fixed effects, random effects and Pooled OLS estimations respectively with significant p-values 
below 0.05. 
l 
BDEXP is observed to have a positive effect on AUDFEE with slope coefficients of 0.659, 0.630 and 0.485 for 
fixed effects, random effects and Pooled OLS estimations respectiv'ely with significant p-values below 0.05. 
BDSIZE also appears to have a positive effect on AUDFEE with slope coefficients of 1.061 , 0.154 and 0.144 for 
fixed effects, random effects and Pooled OLS estimations respectively with significant p-values below 0.05. BDIND 
is also observed to have a positive effect on AUDFEE with slope coefficients of 0.260, 0.216 and 0.090 for fixed 
effects, random effects and Pooled OLS estimations respective ly with significant p-values below 0.05. Furthermore, 
the regression result reveals that ACIND also has positive effect on AUDFEE with slope coefficients of 0.022 , and 
0.085 for the random effects and Pooled OLS estimations only while it appeared negative ( -0.099) for fixed effects 
estimation. However, if we go by the identification test , that is the Hausman's Chi-square statistics, (0.037), the 
fixed effects result is more reliable and actually petfonus better than the random effects and pooled estim(!tions and 
the results explain a significantly higher proportion of systematic variations in AUDFEE. Also, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of the independent variab les does not provide any evidence of multicollinearity in the model. 
The ARCH test for heteroscedasticity was performed on the residuals as a precaution. The results showed 
probabilities in excess of 0.05, which leads us to reject the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. The 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for higher order autocorrelation reveals that the hypotheses of zero autocorrelation in 
the residuals were not rejected. This was because the probabilities (Prob. F, Prob. Chi-Square) were greater tlian 
0.05. The LM test did not therefore reveal setial correlation problems for the model. The perfotmance of the 
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D e c e m b e r ,  2 0 1 4  
R a m s e y  R E S E T  t e s t  s h o w e d  h i g h  p r o b a b i l i t y  v a l u e s  t h a t  w e r e  g r e a t e r  t h a n  0 . 0 5 ,  m e a n i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  n o  
s i g n i f i c a n t  e v i d e n c e  o f  m i s - s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  
D i s c u s s i o n  o f  R e s u l t s  
I n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  H a u s m a n  t e s t ,  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  p a r a m e t e r s  o f  t h e  f i x e d  e f f e c t s  e s t i m a t i o n  a r e  p r e f e t T e d  a n d  a r e  u s e d  f o r  
t h e  d i s c u s s i o n .  T h e  f i x e d  e f f e c t s  r e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t s  s h o w  c l e a r l y  t h a t  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e m a n c e  V a r i a b l e s  { B o a r d  
d i l i g e n c e  ( B D D I L I ) ,  B o a r d  e x p e r t i s e  ( B D E X P ) ,  B o a r d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  ( B D I N D )  B o a r d  s i z e  ( B D S I Z E )  a n d  A u d i t  
c o m m i t t e e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  ( A C I N D ) }  e x e r t  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  o n  A u d i t  f e e  a n d  h e n c e  w e  r e j e c t  H  I - H 5  a n d  c o n c l u d e  
t h a t  C o r p o r a t e  g o v e m a n c e  v a r i a b l e s  e x e r t  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  o n  a u d i t  f e e  i n  N i g e r i a .  
T h e  p o s i t i v e  a n d  s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  B o a r d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i s  i n  t a n d e m  w i t h  t h e  f i n d i n g s  A d e l o p o  &  J a l l o 1 1  
( 2 0 0 8 )  t h a t  b o a r d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a u d i t  a n d  n o n - a u d i t  f e e s  p a i d  t o  
a u d i t o r .  T h e y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i n d e p e n d e n t  b o a r d  p l a y  c r u c i a l  o v e r s i g h t  f u n c t i o n  o n  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  h e n c e  i n d e p e n d e n t  
b o a r d  i s  l i k e l y  t o  p u r c h a s e  m o r e  s e r v i c e s  f r o m  t h e  e x t e m a l  a u d i t o r  t o  s i g n a l  b o a r d ' s  c o m p e t e n c e  a n d  q u a l i t y  o f  a u d i t .  
A l s o  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  o u r  f i n d i n g  i s  t h a t  o f  B l i s s  ( 2 0 1  0 )  w h i c h  f o u n d  t h a t  h i g h e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  b o a r d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  t s  
p o s i t i v e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  h i g h e r  a u d i t  f e e s  p r i c i n g  a n d  c l a i m e d  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  b o a r d  i n d e p e n d e n c e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d e m a n d  a n d  p a y  f o r  t h e  h i g h e r  q u a l i t y  o f  a u d i t  p e 1 f o m 1 e d .  A l s o ,  C a r c e l l o  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 2 )  d o c u m e n t  a  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  a u d i t  f e e s  a n d  b o a r d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a n d  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  s t r o n g e r  b o a r d s  p u r c h a s e  m o r e  a u d i t i n g  s e r v i c e s .  
w h i c h  i n c r e a s e  f e e s .  
O u r  f i n d i n g s  a r e  a l s o  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  G o o d w i n - S t e w a r t  &  K e n t  ( 2 0 0 6 )  w h o  f o u n d  u s i n g  A u s t r a l i a n  f i r m s  t h a t  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  t h e  b o a r d  o f  d i r e c t o r s  h a d  a  p o s i t i v e  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p a c t  o n  a u d i t  f e e s .  U s i n g  M a l a y s i a n  f i m 1 s .  
M u n i a n d y  ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  C E O  d u a l i t y  o n  t h e  b o a r d ,  a  p r o x y  f o r  b o a r d  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  i s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  h i g h e r  a u d i t  f e e s  a n d  t h a t  t h i s  p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  w e a k e n e d  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a  s t r o n g  
i n d e p e n d e n t  a u d i t  c o m m i t t e e .  A n o t h e r  s t u d y  o n  M a l a y s i a n  c o m p a n i e s  ( Y a t i m  e t  a l . ,  2 0 0 6 ) ,  f o u n d  t h a t  a u d i t  f e e s  a r e  
p o s i t i v e l y  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  b o a r d  i n d e p e n d e n c e .  T h e  s t u d y  f i n d i n g  i s  a l s o  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h a t  o f  
A b b o t t ,  P a r k e r ,  P e t e r s  a n d  R a g h u n a n d a n  ( 2 0 0 3 )  t h a t  f o u n d  a  p o s i t i v e  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o i T e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  a u d i t .  
T h e  p o s i t i v e  a n d  s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  B o a r d  s i z e  i s  s u p p o r t e d  b y  B e a s l e y  ( 1 9 9 6 )  t h a t  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  l a r g e r  
b o a r d s  a r e  l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  i n  m o n i t o r i n g  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s  w h i c h  r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t o r  a s s e s s i n g  
t h e  c o n t r o l  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n  t h e  c o m p a n y  a s  w e a k ,  h e n c e  a  h i g h e r  e x t e m a l  a u d i t  f e e s  w i l l  b e  c h a r g e d .  I n  c o n t r a s t .  
Y a t i m  e t  a l .  ( 2 0 0 6 )  f o u n d  t h a t  e x t e m a l  a u d i t  f e e s  a r e  n o t  r e l a t e d  w i t h  t h e  b o a r d  s i z e .  C o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  D i l l i a n  ( 2 0 0 7 )  
w h o  a l s o  f o u n d  t h a t  b o a r d  s i z e  i s  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  e x t e m a l  a u d i t  f e e s .  
T h e  p o s i t i v e  a n d  s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  B o a r d  e x p e r t i s e  i s  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e o r e t i c a l  e x p e c t a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h .  t h e  
p e r s p e c t i v e s  o n  t h e  l i n k  b e t w e e n  t h e  v a t i a b l e s  a n d  a u d i t  f e e  i s  q u i t e  i m p r e c i s e ;  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  o n e  v i e w  i s  t o  e x p e c t  
d i r e c t o r s  w h o  h o l d  m u l t i p l e  d i r e c t o r s h i p s ,  a n d  w h o  p r e s u m a b l y  p o s s e s s  g r e a t e r  e x p e r t i s e ,  t o  b e  m o r e  s u p p o r t i v e  o f  
t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  a  g r e a t e r  a m o u n t  o f  e x t e r n a l  a u d i t i n g  s e r v i c e s ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  h i g h e r  a u d i t  f e e s .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  o n e  
m i g h t  a r g u e  t h a t  a  g r e a t e r  n u m b e r  o f  o t h e r  d i r e c t o r s h i p s  s i g n a l s  e n h a n c e d  q u a l i t y  o f  o v e r s i g h t  b y  t h e  b o a r d  ( i . e  . .  
g r e a t e r  e x p e r t i s e  r e s u l t s  i n  h i g h e r  q u a l i t y  o v e r s i g h t ) ,  a n d  t h i s  e n h a n c e d  o v e r s i g h t  m a y  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  s o m e  o f  t h e  
a u d i t o r ' s  e f f o r t ,  t h u s  d e c r e a s i n g  t h e  f e e .  
T h e  p o s i t i v e  a n d  s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  B o a r d  d i l i g e n c e  m e a s u r e d  b y  n u m b e r  o f  B o a r d  m e e t i n g s ·  p r o v i d e s  
e m p i r i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  t h e 0 1 y  t h a t  m o r e  d i l i g e n t  b o a r d s  w i l l  s e e k  a n  e n h a n c e d  l e v e l  o f  o v e r s i g h t  o f  t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t i n g  p r o c e s s .  A s  s u c h ,  w e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  m o r e  d i l i g e n t  b o a r d s  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  a  g r e a t e r  
a m o u n t  o f  e x t e m a l  a u d i t i n g  s e r v i c e s ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  h i g h e r  a u d i t  f e e s .  A l t h o u g h ,  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  a  
g r e a t e r  n u m b e r  o f  b o a r d  m e e t i n g s  s i g n a l  a n  e n h a n c e d  d e g r e e  o f  o v e r s i g h t  b y  t h e  b o a r d ,  a n d  t h i s  e n h a n c e d  o v e r s i g h t  
m a y  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  s o m e  o f  t h e  a u d i t o r ' s  e f f o r t ,  t h u s  d e c r e a s i n g  t h e  f e e .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a  m o r e  d i l i g e n t  b o a r d  r n a )  
r e d u c e  t h e  a u d i _t o r ' s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  c o n t r o l  r i s k ,  a l s o  r e d u c i n g  t h e  a u d i t  f e e .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  s t u d y  f i n d i n g  i s  c o n s i s t e n •  
w i t h  p t i o r  s t u d i e s  ( C o n g e r ,  e t  a l .  1 9 9 8 ;  P o u n d  1 9 9 5 ;  V a f e a s  1 9 9 9 )  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  b o a r u  
m e e t i n g s  c a n  i n c r e a s e  t h e  A u d i t  f e e .  
T h e  p o s i t i v e  a n d  s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  A u d i t  c o m m i t t e e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a  m o r e  i n d e p e n d e n t  b o a r i l  
w i l l  b e  m o r e  c o n c e r n e d  a b o u t  d i s c h a r g i n g  i t s  m o n i t o r i n g  r o l e  a n d  w i l l  b e  m o r e  s u p p 0 1 1 i v e  o f  t h e  e x t e m a l  a u d  
f u n c t i o n  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  a r e  m o r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a n  e x t e n s i v e  a u d i t  t e s t i n g  i n  o r d e r  t o  m i n i m i z e  t h e  1 i s k  o f  m a n a g e n a .  
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no misbehavior. This is in tandem with Carcello et al. , (2002). This further suggests that companies with greater board 





































Conclusion and Recommendation 
The aim of this paper is to provide greater insight into how corporate govemance mechanisms may influence audit 
fees. An imp01tant novelty of this study is the introduction of the resource provision argument to explain audit fees . 
Following the agency perspective, we argue that from the demand side, corporate g6vemance mechat:~isms may have 
a positive impact on audit fees by ensuring that audit hours are not reduced to a level that compromises the quality 
of the audit. Hence firms with effective corporate govemance may tend to demand additional assurance from their 
auditor to preserve their reputation and avoid potential litigation. From the supply side, the corporate govemance 
involvement in strengthening intemal controls may lead the extemal auditor to reduce the assessed level of control 
risk. 
As a consequence, the auditor' s reliance on intemal controls should result in less substantive testing and hence a 
lower audit fee. This implies that auditing and corporate govemance are co-determined by two countervailing 
relations, namely, a fee-increasing relation and a fee-decreasing relation. Therefore, a company's cost minimization 
problem will be to derive the optimal combination of both corporate govemance and auditing services. To assess our 
arguments, we examine if corporate govemance is a significant determinant of audit fees. We find clearly that 
Corporate Govemance Variables {Board diligence (BDDILI), Board expertise (BDEXP), Board independence 
(BDTND) Board size (BDSIZE) and Audit committee independence (ACIND)} exett a significant effect on Audit 
fee and hence we conclude that Corporate govemance variables exert significant effects on audit fee in Nigeria . It is 
recommended that auditors should have a better understanding of these factors and their relative imp01tance and 
how the factors might be built into an audit fee model. 
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